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RAUSCHENBERG, ROYALTIES, AND ARTISTS’ RIGHTS:
POTENTIAL DROIT DE SUITE LEGISLATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
M. Elizabeth Petty*
“I’ve been working my ass off just for you to make that profit.”1
INTRODUCTION
On a rainy evening in the Upper East Side of New York in October of 1973,
Robert and Ethel Scull made art history.2 The Sculls, who had made their fortune
in the taxi cab business, were selling a portion of their extensive contemporary art
collection3 at Sotheby Parke Bernet4 in preparation for a looming divorce.5 A
Selection of Fifty Works from the Collection of Robert C. Scull6 was the “first
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2014; M.A., Art Business, Sotheby’s
Institute of Art/University of Manchester, 2008; B.A., Art History, University of Virginia,
2006. I would like to thank Michelle Sudano for her help through this process and the staff
members of the Bill of Rights Journal for their hard work on Volume 22. I would also like
to thank my friends and family for their patience, love, and support. Thank you for dragging
me out of the Journal office every once in a while.
1 See ANTHONY HADEN-GUEST, TRUE COLORS: THE REAL LIFE OF THE ART WORLD 16
(1996) (quoting Robert Rauschenberg).
2 See Baruch D. Kirschenbaum, The Scull Auction and the Scull Film, 39 ART J. 50,
50–54 (1979) (discussing the 1973 auction in detail); see also Adam Lindemann, Schooled
by the Sculls, N.Y. OBSERVER (Apr. 21, 2010, 1:41 PM), http://observer.com/2010/04
/schooled-by-the-sculls/.
3 In 2010, the Acquavella Galleries in New York mounted Robert & Ethel Scull:
Portrait of a Collection, with thirty-seven pieces on loan from museums, foundations, and
private collections. See Roberta Smith, Appetite for New and Next New, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2010, at C25. Contemporary art is difficult to define, as economist Don Thompson points
out. DON THOMPSON, THE $12 MILLION STUFFED SHARK: THE CURIOUS ECONOMICS OF
CONTEMPORARY ART 10 (2008). He concludes that “[t]he easiest definition is that contem-
porary art is what is sold by major auction houses in contemporary art sales.” Id.
4 Sotheby’s acquired Parke Bernet, the largest auction house in America, in 1964. See
About, SOTHEBY’S, http://www.sothebys.com/en/inside/about-us.html  (last visited Mar. 2,
2014) [hereinafter SOTHEBY’S].
5 For a discussion on Robert and Ethel Scull’s divorce, see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 882–86 (1998).
6 See SOTHEBY PARKE BERNET INC., A SELECTION OF FIFTY WORKS FROM THE COLLECTION
OF ROBERT C. SCULL (1973).
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devoted to a single collection of [c]ontemporary art”7 featuring artists such as Andy
Warhol, Barnett Newman, and Jasper Johns.8
The record sale, which fetched $2,242,900,9 was a milestone in the history of
the art market. The media attention surrounding the auction was both positive and
negative. André Emmerich, president of the Art Dealers Association, said about the
sale, “I felt awe and shock—that pictures could be worth that much money. And a
certain embarrassment—that the Sculls should have to sell in this way.”10 Others
were less than pleased with what they considered the commercialization of such a
noble field.11 Art historian Barbara Rose argued at the time that the sale was actually
the collapse of the art world, suggesting “[t]he sale itself was a circus, with those
artists dumb enough to attend as a little freak show in a rear room.”12 This debate be-
tween the moral integrity of art versus its often-high value as a commercial good
continues today.
In addition to the critics, another person who was not happy with the sale that
evening was American artist Robert Rauschenberg.13 Rauschenberg saw his Double
Feature, which Scull bought in 1959 for $2,300, sell for $90,000, and his Thaw, which
Scull bought a year prior for $900, fetch $85,000.14 He confronted Scull after the
auction, angrily telling him, “I’ve been working my ass off just for you to make that
profit.”15 Rauschenberg was implying that Scull had received some sort of windfall
in reselling his works, realizing a massive profit that Rauschenberg clearly thought
Scull did not earn or deserve.16 Even if he was pleased with the prices his pieces
7 HADEN-GUEST, supra note 1, at 1.
8 Andy Warhol’s Flowers sold for $135,000; Barnett Newman’s White Fire sold for
$155,000; and Jasper Johns’s Double White Map for $240,000. Barbara Rose, Profit Without
Honor, N.Y. MAG., Nov. 5, 1973, at 80.
9 Kirschenbaum, supra note 2, at 50.
10 HADEN-GUEST, supra note 1, at 17.
11 See Rose, supra note 8, at 80. The art market has continued to grow, with records
consistently set at auction, even during difficult economic times. In November 2013,
Sotheby’s held a record-setting $380 million sale, the highest in the auction house’s history.
See Chris Michaud, A $105 Million Warhol Top Pick at Sotheby’s Best-Ever $380 Million
Auction, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/14/us
-art-auction-idUSBRE9A604L20131114. However, arguably since the Scull auctions, artists
have feared the commercialization of their work. See Grace Glueck, The Mania of Art Auctions:
Problems as Well as Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1988, at A1 (“Artists worry that while their
work commands more money, price fever may be turning art into a commodity.”).
12 Rose, supra note 8, at 80. While some scholars argue that art should be a non-commercial
venture, the art market has remained steadfastly important throughout the history of art. See,
e.g., ELIZABETH A. HONING, PAINTING AND THE MARKET IN EARLY MODERN ANTWERP 13–18
(1998) (describing the relationship between artists and seventeenth-century European markets).
13 See Kirschenbaum, supra note 2, at 51–53.
14 HADEN-GUEST, supra note 1, at 16.
15 Id.
16 Not all artists shared Rauschenberg’s anger. It is reported that pop artist Roy Lichtenstein
asked in response, “What did he want, the work to decrease in value?” Edward Winkleman,
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fetched that night, then Rauschenberg at least wanted a percentage of the profit, or
a type of resale royalty known as droit de suite.
Most scholarly articles on the concept of an American droit de suite begin with
the story of Rauschenberg confronting Scull after the Sotheby’s auction.17 However,
few continue the story to what happened immediately after Rauschenberg told his
collector that he had “work[ed] [his] ass off.” This Note argues that Scull’s response
after Rauschenberg confronted him is arguably more important in the debate about
whether droit de suite legislation should be enacted in the United States. According
to the reports, Scull responded to Rauschenberg, “It works for you, too, Bob. Now
I hope you’ll get even better prices.”18 The story goes that Rauschenberg punched
Scull in the stomach.19 The artist and his collector never spoke again.20
In his response to the artist, Scull emphasized that it takes more than the artist
to increase the value of art work, particularly because the art itself typically has no
inherent value.21 In addition to the artist, collectors, dealers, gallery owners, and mu-
seums all play an important role once the work is created. “Since exhibition history
enhances value, the collectors of what we might call ‘market art’ have a vested in-
terest in seeing their work take up space in traditional public collections.”22 Scull did
seem to have a keen sense of the art market and the appreciation of value. In a mag-
azine article before the auction, he said he wanted to sell the works “[b]ecause the
works have a life of their own. They’re going to outlive me and anyone who buys
them. They have a grip on the concept of art history.”23 However angry Rauschenberg
may have been that October evening, Scull appeared to be correct.24 Rauschenberg
The Case for Droit de Suite in New York, ART NEWSPAPER (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www
.theartnewspaper.com/articles/The-case-for-droit-de-suite-in-New-York/20673. Furthermore,
iconic American artist Jasper Johns reportedly opened a bottle of champagne when he heard
about the sale, anticipating the higher prices he was bound to realize in his future sales. Id.
17 See, e.g., Toni Mione, Resale Royalties for Visual Artists: The United States Taking
Cues from Europe, 21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461, 462–63 (2013) (recounting the
story of Rauschenberg and Scull).
18 HADEN-GUEST, supra note 1, at 16.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Some works, however, do have inherent value. For example, Damien Hirst’s For the
Love of God, a skull encrusted with over 8,600 high-quality diamonds, was offered for sale at
$100 million. See William Shaw, The Iceman Cometh: Damien Hirst Sends a Chill Through
the Art World, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007, at E58; see also DAMIEN HIRST, FOR THE LOVE OF
GOD: THE MAKING OF THE DIAMOND SKULL 5 (2007).
22 James Panero, The Art Market Explained, NEW CRITERION, Dec. 2009, at 26, 29.
23 Dorothy Seiberling, Scull’s Angles: Going Once, Going Twice . . . , N.Y. MAG., Sept. 17,
1973, at 58.
24 John Henry Merryman argues that the increased prices for Rauschenberg’s works was
due in part to “Castelli’s [Rauschenberg’s dealer] successful efforts in promoting Rauschen-
berg’s work.” John Henry Merryman, Comment, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM.
J. COMP. L. 103, 110 (1993). “Some of it was due to the activities of critics, museum curators
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continued to see the value of his works appreciate and today is largely considered
a master in twentieth-century American contemporary art.25 Therefore, Scull’s com-
ment that a successful sale benefits the artist as well as the seller demonstrated an
awareness that Rauschenberg was receiving a type of resale royalty through Scull’s
patronage. However, while Rauschenberg wanted a direct percentage of the final sales
on that autumn evening, Scull was asserting that the royalty received from that sale
would be indirect compensation, which he would realize with future sales.
The repercussions from that evening extended beyond Rauschenberg’s bruised
ego (and Scull’s bruised stomach). Shortly after the auction, in 1976, the California
legislature passed the California Resale Royalty Act (CRRA),26 which allowed artists
to collect a five-percent royalty on any resale of their art over $1,000, if the seller
resided in California or the sale took place in California.27 California was the first
and only state in the country to pass such legislation, known as droit de suite. Droit
de suite is an “art proceeds right,”28 which originated in France in 1920 as “a tech-
nique originally designed to furnish artists and sculptors with some portion of the
increase in the value of their works when they are resold.”29 A majority of European
countries, most recently the United Kingdom, have followed the droit de suite model
and enacted legislation protecting artists.30 While Congress has passed some federal
legislation to protect artists under current federal copyright law, namely the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990,31 any attempt at securing a droit de suite provision has
and venturesome collectors (like the Sculls) who admired, supported, showed and bought
Rauschenberg’s works before he became famous.” Id.
25 Today, Rauschenberg’s work can be seen in museums such as the Museum of Modern
Art, the Whitney Museum of American Art, the Guggenheim Museum, and the Tate Modern.
See generally MARY LYNN KOTZ, RAUSCHENBERG: ART AND LIFE (2004); JAMES LAWRENCE
& JOHN RICHARDSON, ROBERT RAUSCHENBERG (2011).
26 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1976).
27 Id. Until the United Kingdom passed droit de suite legislation, California was the only
common-law jurisdiction with such artist protection. Daniel Grant, ‘Droit de Suite’ Debate
Heats Up, ART NEWS (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.artnews.com/2012/01/11/droit-de-suite
-debate-heats-up/; see also Merryman, supra note 24, at 103 n.1.
28 Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed
Enactment for the United States, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 20, 22 (1966) (explaining the three
main ways to protect an artist are “(1) reproduction rights, (2) moral rights, and/or (3) pro-
ceeds rights (droit de suite)”). Authors have translated the term “droit de suite” differently.
Rita Hauser translated it to “the follow-up right,” as opposed to the “art proceeds right.” Rita
E. Hauser, The French Droit De Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged
Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 2, 5 n.14 (1962).
29 Monroe E. Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of
the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1333 (1968).
30 For a list of European statutes and conventions, see MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 5,
at 374–79; see also Grant, supra note 27.
31 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006)).
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failed.32 While copyright law extends limited protection to artists, as it does to authors
and musicians, it generally focuses on reproduction rights.33 However, while artists
can reproduce their work for the masses, with posters, prints, and other novelty items,
they typically receive economic benefit from the sale of unique works, unlike crea-
tors of other mediums.34
The debate over droit de suite and artists’ rights is once again in the national
spotlight almost forty years after the 1973 Scull auction. In 2011, a group of artists
and representatives of artists’ estates filed a class-action lawsuit alleging California
dealers owed them back royalties pursuant to the CRRA.35 On May 17, 2012, Judge
Jacqueline Nguyen of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted the auction houses’ motion to dismiss the suit, finding the 1976 statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the dormant Commerce Clause.36 The plaintiffs
in the case, including the living artist Chuck Close, have appealed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.37
Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc. shows the artists’ increased interest in the
idea of an American droit de suite. Moreover, it corresponds with another attempt
at federal legislation that was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in late
2011.38 In response to that measure, and arguably Judge Nguyen’s decision in Estate
of Graham, the U.S. Copyright Office conducted an inquiry into the possibility of
incorporating a resale royalty clause into the current Copyright Act.39 In December
of 2013, it recommended that Congress consider adopting a resale royalty provision,
suggesting that artists were at a significant disadvantage compared to other creators.40
Although Judge Nguyen found the state droit de suite statute unconstitutional, the
32 See Helen Stoilas, US Congress Lobbied Hard over Resale Rights, ART NEWSPAPER,
July/Aug. 2011, at 53.
33 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESSLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS,
INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 1321 (3d ed. 2005).
34 Id. A visit to almost any museum gift shop demonstrates the variety of art that can be
mass-produced, from postcards to computer mouse pads to notebooks to jewelry. See, e.g.,
METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART STORE, http://store.metmuseum.org (last visited Mar. 2,
2014); NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART SHOP, http://shop.nga.gov (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
35 Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012), appeal
docketed, No. 12-56077 (9th Cir. June 8, 2012).
36 Id. at 1125.
37 Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. 12-56077 (9th Cir. filed June 8, 2012) (listing
Plaintiff-Appellant Chuck Close as a party to the suit).
38 H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); see also Helen Stoilas, Droit de Suite Bill
Introduced in US Congress, ART NEWSPAPER (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.theartnewspaper
.com/articles/Droit-de-suite-bill-introduced-in-US-Congress/25297.
39 Resale Royalty Right, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,175 (Sept. 19, 2012).
40 See Tracy Zwick, U.S. Copyright Office Endorses Resale Royalty Rights for Visual
Artists, ART IN AM. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features
/news/us-copyright-office-endorses-resale-royalty-rights-for-visual-artists/.
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U.S. Copyright Office’s actions may be the closest artists have come to seeing resale
royalties protection under federal legislation.
This Note will argue that even if the Ninth Circuit reverses the lower court’s
decision and holds that the CRRA is constitutional, it most likely will not dissuade
attempts to enact federal droit de suite legislation in the United States, pursuant to
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.41 While international efforts, par-
ticularly under the European Union,42 have successfully passed droit de suite legis-
lation, this Note will argue that the United States should not adopt federal resale
royalty legislation.
Part I of this Note will provide the general history of droit de suite laws. Part II
will then look at the development of droit de suite in the United States beginning with
the current copyright law through modern efforts to pass federal legislation. This Part
will also discuss the development of the CRRA and the recent decision in Estate of
Graham, analyzing the statute under the dormant Commerce Clause. Part III will
then address the federal legislation attempts including the Equity for Visual Artists
Act of 2011 and the Copyright Office Inquiry of 2012. Part IV will argue against the
enactment of federal droit de suite legislation because of the potential harm to the
art market, including the impracticability of administering the law and the disincen-
tive for investment in younger, emerging artists.
This Note will conclude that droit de suite legislation will have a potential harm-
ful impact on the U.S. economy and specifically the American art market by arguing
that Scull was correct in 1973—that artists are currently receiving a benefit with
appreciated values, regardless of whether they receive a percentage of the resale.
Artists, particularly emerging artists, may be in a better financial position without a
codified droit de suite clause if collectors are incentivized to invest in them, there-
fore allowing the secondary market to work to increase the image of these artists and
the value of their works. Robert Rauschenberg complained that he worked for his
collector to realize the profits. However, collectors, like Scull, investors, dealers,
and museums also play an essential role in the art market by increasing the name
recognition of artists and, accordingly, the value of their works. This Note argues
that Rauschenberg was wrong to accuse Scull of unfairly benefitting from his work.
Instead, it will argue that collectors and dealers do not receive a windfall from
appreciation in value when they sell pieces because they are an integral piece of the
art market in helping artists see appreciated values.
41 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (conferring upon Congress the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”).
42 See infra Part II; see, e.g., Victor Ginsburgh, The Economic Consequences of Droit de
Suite in the European Union, EUR. CTR. FOR ADVANCED RES. IN ECON. & STAT. (Mar. 2006),
available at http://www.ecares.org/ecare/personal/ginsburgh/papers/143.consequences.pdf
(analyzing the impact of the European Union directive requiring member states to pass droit
de suite legislation).
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I. HISTORY OF DROIT DE SUITE
In 1920, France enacted the first droit de suite legislation after French legisla-
tors heard stories of “artists who died in misery at a time when their paintings were
bringing enormous sums, among them Millet, Cezanne [sic], and Gauguin.”43 How-
ever, the rationale behind droit de suite, particularly protecting the “starving artist,”
began in the late nineteenth century, ultimately resulting in the creation of the Société
des Amis du Luxembourg, which aimed to establish a droit de suite in France.44 The
folklore behind the law is the ideal of the “starving artist,” who suffers to provide
for his family while others profit from his creativity.45 The Société and the French
press pushed until the Parliament passed the droit de suite in 1920, where it remains
in effect.46 The law was designed to protect artists the same way it protected creators
of similar mediums.47
Under French civil law, droit de suite was traditionally considered a “moral
right[],” meaning that it is a natural right inherent in the artist and thus not a part of
copyright law.48 In other words, the rights were seen as equitable rights as opposed
to a form of incentive, an often-cited purpose of copyright law.49 Elliott C. Alderman
argues that the civil-law foundation is one of the fundamental problems of droit de
43 Hauser, supra note 28, at 2–3. See generally JANE TURNER, FROM MONET TO
CEZANNE: LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY FRENCH ARTISTS (2003) (providing a biography of
Millet, Cézanne, and Gauguin and a general history of the artistic period of the late nine-
teenth century).
44 Hauser, supra note 28, at 4.
45 Price, supra note 29, at 1335.
46 See Hauser, supra note 28, at 4–5.
47 Id. at 5–6. Rita Hauser argues that the term should be droit d’auteur (“author’s rights”)
because the droit de suite “was in no way conceived of as a special, unique right given to
artists, but, rather, was intended to ensure them a benefit parallel to that which writers and
composers derive through royalties.” Id.
48 Jennifer J. Wirsching, The Time Is Now: The Need for Federal Resale Royalty Legislation
in Light of the European Union Directive, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 431, 434 (2006). Droit de suite
differs from another fundamental right, droit moral, which protects an artist’s creativity. See
JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CULTURAL TREASURES 21–25 (1999); see also Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the
Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1 (1980) (discussing droit moral and its comparisons to droit de
suite and copyright).
49 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 285 (“To encourage authors to create and disseminate original expression,
[copyright law] accords them a bundle of proprietary rights in their works.”); see also Stuart
Asher Tanenbaum, Droit de Suite: Just How Sweet Is It?, SETON HALL L. STUDENT SCHOL-
ARSHIP (May 1, 2013), http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/315 (“Incentives
encourage creation by giving a successful creator the financial ability to continue to create
and to cover the costs of creating.”).
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suite.50 He writes that the natural law as developed in Europe “views art as a meta-
physical concept instead of a market commodity, and ignores the realities of low
profit margins, expenses of ownership and sale, and the inequity of sharing profit
without risking loss.”51
Art is certainly a market commodity, as seen with the huge and seemingly im-
penetrable art market, and accordingly droit de suite is more appropriately situated
in American copyright law that is designed to protect a creator’s market commodity.52
The Scull auction was arguably the beginning of the this “contemporary art bubble,”
which “has been inflating for nearly forty years [since the Scull auction]. The larger
this bubble gets, the more indestructible it seems.”53 For instance, in November 2012,
almost forty years after the Scull sale, Christie’s and Sotheby’s fetched $787 million
in their contemporary auctions, suggesting to some that the art market may be more
than just a bubble and may actually be recession-proof.54 That figure was eclipsed
in November 2014 when Sotheby’s fetched a record-$380 million at its contempo-
rary sale55 and Christie’s held the most expensive single auction in history fetching
$691.6 million.56 In a recent letter to the editor in The New York Times, William Cole
wrote that this bubble is the result of “hype” surrounding the art market.57 He argues
that collectors and investors “know the value of hype. They understand that if art-
works sell at exorbitant prices, those works—and the artists who created them—
become newsworthy, regardless of whether they’re actually any good.”58 Economist
Don Thompson argues that, much to the dismay of artists, “[e]xpensive work becomes
50 Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Artists: An
Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 265, 267–70 (1992).
51 Id. at 282; see also Michael B. Reddy, The Droite de Suite: Why American Fine Artists
Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509, 515 (1995) (“Some
oft-cited examples of this disparity include the resale of a Degas painting originally pur-
chased for 500 francs and later resold in 1912 for 436,000 francs [and] Millet’s Angelus,
resold for a million francs a few years after its original sale price of 70,000 francs . . . .”).
52 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
53 Panero, supra note 22, at 29. The contemporary market has continued to grow, despite
the recent financial crisis. “Even if contemporary art seems alien or odd to you, consider this:
the market for this art has outperformed the Standard & Poor’s list of 500 common stocks
since 2003.” Even in Tough Times, Contemporary Art Sells, CBS (Apr. 2, 2012, 7:09 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/even-in-tough-times-contemporary-art-sells/. For a discussion
of why the contemporary art market continues to grow, see Art Market, 60 MINUTES (Apr. 1,
2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7403948n&tag=contentBody;storyediaBox.
54 William Cole, Invitation to a Dialogue: An Art Market Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2013, at A18.
55 See Michaud, supra note 11.
56 See Kathryn Tully, The Most Expensive Art Ever Sold at Auction: Christie’s Record-
Breaking Sale, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kathryntully
/2013/11/13/the-most-expensive-art-ever-sold-at-auction-christies-record-breaking-sale/.
57 Cole, supra note 54.
58 Id.
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meaningful in part because it is expensive.”59 Therefore, the concept of protecting
artists through resale royalties may be better placed in the realm of copyright law,
and not moral law.
Today, every European country except Switzerland has codified a version of
droit de suite.60 Currently, the French droit de suite law sets resale royalties at three
percent of the sale price through either auction or through a dealer.61 In addition,
several other Latin and South American countries, and a handful of African countries,
have a form of droit de suite legislation. These countries include Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, and Morocco.62 Most recently, China introduced a droit de suite provi-
sion in a draft of new copyright legislation that would provide for a resale royalty for
original works sold at auction.63 Opponents of the legislation cite the same arguments
as those in the United States, including its potential negative impact on the market.64
Prior to the enactment of the first French droit de suite legislation, European
nations met in 1886 for the first Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works.65 The Convention, governed by the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization, met to discuss international copyright standards, with the goal to “constitute
a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”66
Article 14ter was added in 1948, which set up an optional droit de suite provision:
(1) The author, or after his death the persons or institutions
authorized by national legislation, shall, with respect to
59 THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 178.
60 DROIT DE SUITE, http://www.coramjames.com/press/007/droit-de-suite.html (last visited
Mar. 2, 2014); see also LERNER & BRESSLER, supra note 33, at 1326–27.
61 LERNER & BRESSLER, supra note 33, at 1322 (explaining the most current version of
the French droit de suite law was incorporated into copyright law in 1957 when it also ex-
panded the law to dealer sales as well as auction sales).
62 For a list of world droit de suite legislation, see id. at 1326–27.
63 Katie Hunt, China Debates Droit de Suite, ART NEWSPAPER, Feb. 2013, at 5; see also
David S. W. Ma, Note, Right to Integrity and the Proposed Resale Royalty Right and
Notification Right in the PRC Copyright Law, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 477 (2013) (comparing
the Chinese droit de suite laws to the British laws and proposed American laws).
64 Hunt, supra note 63.
65 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter The Berne Convention]. The
Berne Convention sought to protect the moral rights of creators, while American copyright
law protects the property rights of creators. Therefore, the two frameworks are fundamentally
different from each other. See Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990: American Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 380 (1995) (discussing how
moral rights are distinct from economic rights); see also Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights
Protection and Resale Royalties for Visual Art in the United States: Development and
Current Status, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387, 387–88 (1994) (describing moral rights
required by the Berne Convention).
66 The Berne Convention, supra note 65, at art. 1.
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original words of art and original manuscripts of writers and
composers, enjoy the inalienable right to an interest in any
sale of the work subsequent to the first transfer by the author
of the work.
(2) The protection provided by the preceding paragraph may
be claimed in a country of the Union only if legislation in
the country to which the author belongs so permits, and to
the extent permitted by the country where this protection
is claimed.67
The United States did not join the Berne Convention until 1988, but even after it
joined, Congress continued to resist implementing any moral rights provisions under
current copyright law.68
The United States continued to resist complying fully with the requirements of
the Berne Convention until President George H. W. Bush signed the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) into law.69 With the passage of that law, American art-
ists finally enjoyed full protection of copyright interests abroad; however, they still
were not entitled to resale royalties.70
II. DROIT DE SUITE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides: “The Congress shall
have the Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”71 However, artistic works have not fallen easily within
the copyright protections in the United States. “Since its origins in Roman law, copy-
right has concentrated on protecting creations capable of being reproduced or ‘copied’
rather than on individual objects.”72 Accordingly, copyright law typically has bene-
fitted creators such as authors, composers, and filmmakers, rather than artists, be-
cause “fine art . . . is fundamentally different” than other mediums.73 Artists typically
create unique objects, for instance as seen with the traditional mediums of painting
67 Id. at art. 14ter.
68 Wirsching, supra note 48, at 437.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 437–38; see also Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5689 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006)).
71 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
72 Reddy, supra note 51, at 534.
73 Id.
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and sculpture.74 The Copyright Act protects creators “of original works of author-
ship,” which gives artists the right to make reproductions, distribute copies, and per-
form or exhibit publicly.75 Accordingly, while somewhat protected under American
copyright law, “artists are not allowed to profit from the increased value of their
work to the same extent as writers and composers.”76 Authors and composers are in
a different position than artists because they “receive royalties through reproduction
and performances rights for all the copies of their works that are exploited.”77 Artists,
on the other hand, typically only are paid for the first sale because they normally do
not see any reproduction rights, and “they lose their most remunerative right—that
of public display—once they sell their creations.”78 Because of the restrictions of
the copyright law, some have argued that droit de suite is the only way to allow
artists to profit from the appreciation of their work in the same manner as authors
and composers.79
In 1990, Congress passed the Visual Artist Rights Act (VARA),80 granting art-
ists additional rights but stopping short of codifying a resale right.81 Senator Edward
Kennedy82 and Representative Robert Kastenmeier83 introduced the legislation that
was passed and codified as part of the current Copyright Act. VARA had dual aims:
“[T]o secure the rights of visual artists to prevent the intentional mutilation or de-
struction of their work, and to provide for resale royalties.”84 The statute provides
74 Id.
75 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
76 Reddy, supra note 51, at 532–33. Furthermore, the first sale doctrine allows buyers of
an artist’s work to display it publicly without seeking the artist’s permission. Id. at 533.
77 Alderman, supra note 50, at 273.
78 Id. at 273–74. The Copyright Act of 1976 gave artists the right to display their work
in public. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2006) (“[I]n the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, [the copyright owner has
the right] to display the copyrighted work publicly.”). However, the first sale doctrine allows
buyers of an artist’s work to display it publicly without seeking the artist’s permission. Reddy,
supra note 51, at 533.
79 See, e.g., Reddy, supra note 51, at 533 (“Until Congress passes droit de suite legisla-
tion, or some equivalent, this inequity in the American copyright scheme will remain.”). But
see Alderman, supra note 50, at 274 (“[I]t is extremely difficult to establish with any empirical
certainty that the copyright treatment of fine artists is detrimental, and not just disparate.”).
80 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5689 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006)).
81 Id. But see Sherman, supra note 65, at 377 (“VARA does not provide moral rights
protection for the authors of literary works, motion pictures, audiovisual works, computer
programs, musical works, or many other creative works, which are all otherwise subjects of
copyright protection under United States law.”).
82 S. 1198, 101st Cong., 135 Cong. Rec. S6811-13 (daily ed. June 16, 1989).
83 H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 136 Cong. Rec. H3111-16 (daily ed. June 5, 1990).
84 Schuyler Chapin & Alberta Arthurs, A Bill of Rights for Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1987, at A31. Chapin was the chairman of the Independent Committee on Arts Policy and
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that “the author of a work of visual art (1) shall have the right to. . . (A) claim au-
thorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of
any work of visual art which he or she did not create.”85 Further, the statute gives
artists the right “to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of
visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”86 Therefore, the Act
protects the artistic integrity of individual works, aligning the legislation closer to
the moral rights protected in civil-law countries, such as France, as opposed to pro-
tecting the commodity, typically seen with copyright law.87
The original legislation included a resale royalties clause, allowing for a royalty
of “seven percent from the resale profit whenever the sale price of a work of fine art
was one hundred-fifty percent above the purchase price.”88 Despite this provision, it
was ultimately struck from the codified version of VARA “due to opposition from art
dealers, gallery owners, auction houses, and others.”89 Despite this, VARA, as passed,
required the Copyright Office to conduct a feasibility study regarding possible droit
de suite legislation in the future.90
The “Study on the Resale Royalties for Works of Art” was conducted during
1991.91 The inquiry asked the public,92 in part, the following questions:
Arthurs was the president of the organization. Id. The group supported the bill, concluding
that “those gifted with the insight, imagination and inventiveness to create fine art are due
recognition and protection from Congress.” Id. Despite having many artist proponents, the
legislation also had its detractors. See Clay Johnson, Letter to the Editor, Next We’ll Need
to Have Art Officially Defined, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at A30 (“Every artisan who
manufactures an artifact would want a good reason why he too shouldn’t get a royalty for his
art. The answer would be to set up a panel or commission to settle the inevitable disputes.
This is where the problem begins. . . . Get out of my life, Ted Kennedy.”). But see Arnold A.
Gurwitch, Letter to the Editor, Resale Royalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1987, at 30 (“The text
introduced by Senator Kennedy contains a clear definition of what constitutes a ‘work of fine
art’ in the application of the bill.”).
85 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) (2006).
86 Id. § 106(2).
87 Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System
of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 947 (1990).
88 Reddy, supra note 51, at 525. From an economic perspective, Ben Bolch argued that
the droit de suite provision would depress original prices for works and would punish
investors who took risks with young artists. Ben W. Bolch, There Is No ‘Just Price’ for Art,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1987, at 23 (“A royalty proposal by Kennedy is misguided.”).
89 Reddy, supra note 51, at 525.
90 Id.
91 Request for Information; Study on Resale Royalties for Works of Art, 56 Fed. Reg.
4110 (Jan. 24, 1991).
92 The Copyright Office was particularly interested in hearing from those “involved in
the creation, exhibition, dissemination, and preservation of works of art, including artists, art
dealers, auction houses, investment advisors, collectors of fine art, and curators of art mu-
seums.” Id.
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(1) Would resale royalty legislation promote or discourage the
creation of new works of art, and if so, how? . . .
(2) If resale royalty legislation is appropriate, what form should
it take? . . .
(3) Who should benefit from the requirement? . . .
(4) What should the term of any resale requirement be? . . .
(5) Should there be any enforcement mechanisms, central col-
lecting societies, or registration requirements?93
In December of 1992, the U.S. Copyright Office produced a 760-page report
entitled Droit de Suite: The Artist’s Resale Royalty.94 The report carefully analyzed
the effects of droit de suite legislation in other civil-law countries, such as France,
Belgium, and Germany, before considering the implications of a similar statute in
the United States.95 The Report echoed some of the criticisms of droit de suite,
including that it would not encourage creation because “resale royalties benefit only
a very small percentage of artists and will depress prices for works in the primary
market, possibly chilling rather than stimulating the incentive to create.”96 The Report
also acknowledged a possible privacy issue: “[T]hat artists would need to obtain cer-
tain information about sales prices and ownership that sellers, purchasers, and other
owners may not want to disclose.”97 In its conclusion, the Report noted: “Copyright
legislation in the United States is grounded in the constitutional clause [as opposed
to the moral right of paternity], which motivates creativity, while encouraging the
broad public dissemination of works.”98 The emphasis on encouraging creativity high-
lights the fundamental difference between France and the United States’ approach
to droit de suite.99
Ultimately, the Report recommended that because “the Copyright Office [was]
not persuaded that sufficient economic and copyright policy justification exist[ed,]”
Congress should not enact droit de suite legislation.100 However, it included a caveat:
“Should the European community harmonize existing droit de suite laws, Congress
93 Id.
94 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 REPORT].
95 Id. at ii–iv.
96 Id. at x.
97 Id. at 130.
98 Id. at 142.
99 See Tanenbaum, supra note 49, at 9 (“An incentive is something ‘which urges to ac-
tion, especially a promised reward for working harder.’ To urge to action, it must be forward-
looking. In contrast, a right of equity in this context would be based upon rewarding past efforts
and be something the creator would gain that does not result solely from the creator’s own
choices.” (footnote omitted)). However, Tanenbaum argues that droit de suite “is an incentive
in form, [but] it is entangled with being an equitable vehicle for creators.” Id. (footnote omitted).
100 1992 REPORT, supra note 94, at 149.
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may want to take another look at the resale royalty, particularly if the Community
decides to extend the royalty to all its member States.”101 Therefore, the U.S. Copy-
right Office did not recommend the passage of any legislation in the United States at
that time, but it left the door open for a possible review if the European Community
“harmonized” its efforts.102 However, the concerns regarding droit de suite legisla-
tion that the study highlighted are still present today, suggesting these issues are fun-
damental, inherent challenges in the American art market—and to some extent the
global art market. Therefore, the question should not be when this type of legislation
should be passed, but whether it should ever be passed in the United States.
Despite this concern, the harmonization to which the Report referred likely
occurred in 2001 when the European Union required member nations, both civil and
common-law countries, to pass some form of resale royalty act.103 The directive had
two stages.104 Beginning in 2006, living artists could receive royalty payments; how-
ever, the law allowed countries that did not have such legislation until 2012 to pass a
law to extend droit de suite to artists’ estates.105 Because of the move by the European
Union, particularly in the United Kingdom, as well as other factors that will be dis-
cussed below, Congress, in fact, reopened the inquiry into possible resale royalty
legislation.106 The U.S. Copyright Office released its report in December 2013, chang-
ing its position and suggesting that Congress consider passing some type of legisla-
tion to protect artists.107
B. California Resale Royalty Act
Beyond the attempts at federal legislation, at least one state determined to take
on the issue of resale royalty. A potential result of the backlash from the 1973 Scull
auction, in 1976 California became the first and only state to pass a resale royalties
act.108 The California Resale Royalty Act (CRRA) requires that 
101 Id. (emphasis added).
102 Id.
103 Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC) [hereinafter E.U. Directive].
104 Shane Ferro, Europe’s Droit De Suite Dilemma: Threat to the Art Boom or Tempest in
a Teapot?, BLOUIN ART INFO (July 14, 2011), http://ca.blouinartinfo.com/visual-arts/article
/38042-europes-droit-de-suite-dilemma-threat-to-the-art-boom-or-tempest-in-a-teapot.
105 Id.
106 Resale Royalty Right, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,175 (Sept. 19, 2012) (requesting information,
in part, regarding current copyright law; promoting production of creative works; fostering
the art marketplace; and contractual considerations).
107 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS (2013)
[hereinafter 2013 REPORT], available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco
-resaleroyalty.pdf.
108 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1976); see also Ben W. Bolch et al., An Economic Analysis
of the California Art Royalty Statute, 10 CONN. L. REV. 689 (1978); California Resale
Royalty Act, CAL. ARTS COUNCIL, http://www.cac.ca.gov/artsinfo/resaleroyalty.php (last
visited Mar. 2, 2014) (providing guidance for artists).
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Whenever a work of fine art109 [over $1,000] is sold and the
seller resides in California or the sale takes place in California,
the seller or the seller’s agent shall pay to the artist of such work
of fine art or to such artist’s agent 5 percent of the amount of
such sale.110
Further, the statute requires that “[w]hen a work of fine art is sold at an auction
or by a gallery, dealer, broker, museum, or other person acting as the agent for the
seller the agent shall withhold 5 percent of the amount of the sale, locate the artist
and pay the artist.”111 If the seller cannot find the artist, the royalty is due to the Cali-
fornia Arts Council, which is tasked with locating the artist.112 At the time, several
younger artists feared that collectors may stop investing in them to avoid paying fu-
ture royalties.113 For instance, a California sculptor commented at the time, “If the
law turns off the collectors . . . and has a negative effect on selling art in the first
place, then all we’ve done is lost something.”114
When the statute was passed, many artists clearly were pleased with the move
towards droit de suite. However, collectors, dealers, and museum officials over-
whelmingly opposed the law.115 Among their criticisms were its application “to sales
outside of California;” “application to sales by dealers and to private sales;” and
“giving the artist 5% of the gross resale price rather than a percentage of the profit,
if any, on the resale.”116 Moreover, soon after the legislation passed, artists were faced
with challenges in collecting the royalties, resulting in supporters of the state statute
asking Congress for help in passing federal legislation.117
109 The statute defines “fine art” as “an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an orig-
inal work of art in glass.” § 986(c)(2).
110 Id. § 986(a).
111 Id. § 986(a)(1).
112 Id. § 986(a)(2)(5).
113 William Bates, Royalties for Artists: California Becomes the Testing Ground, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1977, § 2, at 1 (describing that “younger artists . . . see the royalties due
established artists as a threat to their own careers”).
114 Id. Interestingly, when the California legislation was passed, Robert Rauschenberg
publicly announced that he would give all of his royalties to a foundation he established
called “Change, Inc.,” which provided grants to emerging artists who are experiencing diffi-
cult financial situations. See Daniel Grant, Emergency Relief Funds Help Artists in Dire Need,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-grant
/emergency-relief-funds-he_b_969297.html.
115 See, e.g., Bates, supra note 113.
116 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 5, at 382.
117 See Everett R. Holles, California Law Giving Royalties to Artists Is Stymied by
Complications, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1977, at 53 (“Representative Henry A. Waxman, . . . who
concedes that enforcement of royalty payments by an individual state is virtually impossible
because of the secrecy of many art sales and the opportunity for out-of-state ‘bootlegging,’
has drafted the Visual Arts Act of 1977.”).
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The statute was challenged soon after its enactment in Morseburg v. Balyon.118
Henry Morseburg, a Beverly Hills art dealer, appealed a decision in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, that had found the CRRA was not pre-
empted by the 1909 Copyright Act119 nor did it violate the Contract Clause of the
Constitution.120 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the CRRA was not uncon-
stitutional because it was not preempted by the 1909 Copyright Act.121 Morseburg
argued that the CRRA “‘restricts the transfer’ of a copyrighted ‘work of fine art’
when in the hands of one who lawfully obtained it, such as a purchaser from the
artist.”122 The court held that works of art often are not copyrighted because of “ig-
norance, a distaste for legal details, weak bargaining power, and the desire to avoid
defacing the work with a copyright symbol.”123 However, the reason why artists do
not copyright pieces of art is arguably not due to ignorance but rather because the
majority of art sold on the secondary market are unique works. Nonetheless, the
court was correct in highlighting the fact that many pieces of art are not copyrighted.
The court held that the CRRA provides an additional protection to artists, and
thus the1909 Copyright Act did not preempt the statute.124 Therefore, the CRRA was
upheld in 1980. While the court did not review the statute under the 1976 Copyright
Act, Jennifer Clarke made the following analysis in 1981:
Offering a means to test this analysis, the California Resale
Royalt[y] Act grants a right with respect to fine art, a subject
118 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
119 The Ninth Circuit did not consider whether the CRRA violated the Copyright Act of
1976 because the sales were made before the passage of the revised act. For a discussion of
how the CRRA would fare under the Copyright Act of 1976, see Bob Jones, Morseburg v.
Balyon—The High Court Grants Royalty a Reprieve: Constitutional Challenges to the
California Resale Royalty Act, 3 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1980).
120 Id. at 2.
121 Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978 (“These observations permit us to conclude that the 1909
Copyright Act has not occupied the area with which we are concerned and that the California
Act is not in conflict with it.”); see also Jennifer R. Clarke, Note, The California Resale
Royalties Act as a Test Case for Preemption Under the 1976 Copyright Law, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1315, 1320 (1981) (“By force of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, a federal
statute displaces a state statute when the state statute interferes with the purposes of the
federal statute.”).
122 Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 975.
123 Id. at 975–76.
124 The Ninth Circuit held that Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), was con-
trolling. Morseburg, 621 F.2d. at 977. In that case, the appellants were convicted under a
“California statute making it a criminal offense to ‘pirate’ recordings produced by others.”
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 548. The Court in Goldstein held that the scope of the statute was not
preempted by the 1909 Copyright Act. Id. at 571 (“We conclude that the State of California has
exercised a power which it retained under the Constitution, and that the challenged statute, as
applied in this case, does not intrude into an area which Congress has, up to now, pre-empted.”).
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matter which is also protected under the Copyright Act. The right
conflicts with one provision of the Copyright Act, but neither of
the two primary purposes of copyright law—providing an in-
centive to authors and ensuring the flow of ideas into the public
domain—is significantly impeded by the [resale royalty] right.
The California Act, therefore, is not preempted by the [1976]
Copyright Act.125
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court,126 upholding, for at least the next thirty-
two years, the constitutionality of the CRRA.127 The court’s holding in Morseburg v.
Balyon was the first and only time a court ruled on the constitutionality of the CRRA
until 2012.
C. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc.
In 2011, a group of artists, including Chuck Close,128 Laddie John Dill,129 and
the estate of Robert Graham,130 filed a class action complaint against Sotheby’s and
Christie’s, both New York–based premier auction houses.131 The artists and their
heirs claimed that the auction houses owed them back royalties under the CRRA.132
125 Clarke, supra note 121, at 1332.
126 Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 974–75.
127 See High Court Upholds Artists’ Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1980, at C14; see
also Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding
that the CRRA violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution).
128 See Anandashankar Mazumdar, Two Lawsuits by Artists May Test Validity of California
Resale Royalty Rights Statute, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.bna.com/two
-lawsuits-artists-n12884904025; see also Interview by Steven Colbert with Chuck Close
(Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/343737
/August-12-2010/chuck-close. For more information on Close, considered “one of America’s
most celebrated living artists,” see CHRISTOPHER FINCH, CHUCK CLOSE: WORK (2010).
129 See Mazumdar, supra note 128; see also LADDIE JOHN DILL OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://
www.laddiejohndill.com/index.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
130 See Mazumdar, supra note 128. For a detailed analysis of one of Graham’s most fa-
mous public works, see JACK MILES ET AL., ROBERT GRAHAM: THE GREAT BRONZE DOORS
FOR THE CATHEDRAL OF OUR LADY OF THE ANGELS (2002); Suzanne Muchnic & Cara Mia
DiMassa, Robert Graham, 1938–2008: Sculptor’s Legacy Is Visible All over L.A., L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2008, at A1.
131 Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
132 Id. Christie’s and Sotheby’s have not been without scandal throughout their long
history in the art world. In 2001, both auction houses were defendants in an antitrust trial,
after being accused of price-fixing. The trial, which shook the art world, resulted in the im-
prisonment of Sotheby’s CEO, Alfred Taubman. See generally CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE
ART OF THE STEAL: INSIDE THE SOTHEBY’S–CHRISTIE’S AUCTION HOUSE SCANDAL (2005)
(providing both a history of the auction houses and a closer look at the scandal).
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In an interview, Chuck Close said that the lawsuit was “a question of basic fair-
ness.”133 The artists alleged that the auction houses—“acting as the agents for Cali-
fornia sellers—sold works of fine art at auction but failed to pay the appropriate resale
royalty provided for under the CRRA.”134 In their complaint, the artists alleged that
“Sotheby’s custom and practice is to conceal the fact of a seller’s California resi-
dency, or the fact that a sale took place in California, from communications with the
public concerning auctions and sales of Fine Art.”135 The defendant auction houses
filed a motion to dismiss the claim based on three allegations: that (1) the California
Resale Royalty Act violated the Commerce Clause; (2) the Act constituted a taking
for purposes of the U.S. and state constitutions; and (3) that the 1976 Copyright
Clause preempted the statute.136 Judge Jacqueline Nguyen, of the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California, agreed with the auction houses and granted
their motion to dismiss.137 She decided the case on the narrowest grounds, analyzing
the suit under the Commerce Clause, and did not address the takings or preemption
arguments.138 The plaintiffs have appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit.139
Judge Nguyen analyzed the statute under the dormant Commerce Clause, hold-
ing that “[a] state statute implicates the dormant Commerce Clause if the activity it
regulates could likewise be regulated by Congress.”140 Determining that the art mar-
ket was within Congress’s reach under the Commerce Clause, she continued her
analysis, concluding that the California law was facially discriminatory and per se
invalid. In doing so, Judge Nguyen cited Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.,141 in which the
Supreme Court held that “a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly
outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was
intended by the legislature.”142 She determined that, despite the fact that the defen-
dants were New York corporations, they were still bound by the CRRA “by virtue
of selling art that is owned by a California seller—even if the transaction takes place
133 Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuits, Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2011, at C1.
134 Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
135 Class Action Complaint at 3, Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (No. 2:11-cv-08604-JHN-FFM).
136 Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
137 Id.
138 Id. For a brief analysis of the two issues that Judge Nguyen did not address, see Mione,
supra note 17, at 473–78.
139 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., No. 12-56067 (9th
Cir. Feb. 28, 2013).
140 Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (citing Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning,
301 F.3d 985, 993 (9th Cir. 2002)).
141 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
142 Id. at 336.
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wholly in New York, and even if the beneficiary of the 5% royalty is a New York
artist.”143 She found
that the CRRA explicitly regulates applicable sales of fine art
occurring wholly outside California. Under its clear terms, the
CRRA regulates transactions occurring anywhere in the United
States, so long as the seller resides in California. Even the artist—
the intended beneficiary of the CRRA—does not have to be a
citizen of, or reside in, California.144
However, while Judge Nguyen held that the statute was per se invalid because it was
facially discriminatory, it appears that she applied the wrong test to the statute.
Furthermore, both auction houses have an “extensive presence” in California
with sale rooms in multiple California cities.145 Because of their presence in the
state, the plaintiffs in the case have argued that the statute is per se valid because it
satisfies the bright-line rule established by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,146 which
states that “all that is needed for a state to impose such a duty on an out-of-state
merchant, consistent with the Commerce Clause, is that the out-of-state merchant
have a ‘physical presence’ in the state imposing the levy.”147 Therefore, “if [an out-
of-state] merchant has a physical presence in the levy-imposing state (or employs
persons in the state), then there is no Commerce Clause barrier in requiring the
merchant to fulfill the levy-collection and payment obligation.”148 Because the auc-
tion houses do have a visible presence in California, the Appellants argue that the
statute does not violate the Commerce Clause and does not reach unfairly outside
of the state.
Even if the Ninth Circuit does not hold that the statute is per se valid, it could
still find the statute constitutional under the analysis set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.,149 which states that “[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inci-
dental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”150 The legitimate local interest is
to protect artists, and it is possible that the Ninth Circuit may find that the burden
on interstate commerce is minimal compared to the burden on the state. However,
it is also possible that the court will agree with Judge Nguyen that the burden on
143 Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
144 Id. at 1124 (citations omitted).
145 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 139, at 11–12.
146 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
147 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 139, at 18 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15).
148 Id. at 20 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 315).
149 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
150 Id. at 142.
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interstate commerce, namely the use of agents outside of the state, outweighs the
benefit to artists.
Moreover, Judge Nguyen seemed to overlook the fact that there is a California
connection in all of these sales—either the sale took place in California or the seller
was a California resident. Christie’s and Sotheby’s, although New York–based com-
panies, were only acting as agents for the seller. Therefore, they had “affirmatively
chosen to subject” themselves to the California statute by contracting with the sellers
or selling in California.151 Therefore, pursuant to the dormant Commerce Clause’s
goal, the CRRA “burdens only in-state interests and, thus, gives out-of-state interests
an advantage.”152
Judge Nguyen granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. However, as stated
above, the artists have filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, on which Judge Nguyen
recently has been confirmed as a judge.153 Following her decision, plaintiffs’ counsel,
Eric George, made a statement regarding her decision:
The artist protection law was properly enacted by California’s
legislative and executive processes, pursuant to powers the U.S.
Constitution reserves to the states. For a single federal judge to
invalidate the law more than 35 years later and without allowing
any evidence to be taken, it marks a departure from established
constitutional law. We are confident, as both sides have always
believed, this case will ultimately be resolved by the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, which already upheld this very statute in 1981
[in Morseburg v. Balyon].154
The artists filed a motion to stay the decision with Judge Michael Fitzgerald of the
Central District of California. However, Judge Fitzgerald denied the motion, stating
that, “Apart from whatever rights accrued to Sotheby’s and Christie’s, the Order is
not a binding precedent on other district courts either within or outside the Ninth
Circuit. . . . The Court can no more ‘stay’ the Order than it could ‘stay’ a law review
article.”155 Michael Bowse, one of the lawyers for the artists, reportedly made the
motion as a way “to clarify to all parties—as well as the media—that the law remains
151 See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 2001).
152 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 139, at 35.
153 See Lisa Mascaro, Jacqueline H. Nguyen of L.A. Confirmed to U.S. 9th Circuit Court,
L.A. TIMES (May 7, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/07/nation/la-na-nguyen
-20120508.
154 Alison Frankel, Should Artists Get Royalties on Resales? California Judge Says No,
THOMPSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (May 19, 2012, 5:26 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com
/alison-frankel/2012/05/19/should-artists-get-royalties-on-resales-california-judge-says-no
(quoting Eric George).
155 Order Denying Ex Parte Application, Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. CV-11-
8604-MWF (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2012).
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in effect.”156 Some media outlets have called the motion a “backhanded win,” claim-
ing the denial of the motion “means that the auction houses will have to keep fighting
to avoid the possibility of having to pay artists royalties for reselling their work in
California.”157 Because Judge Nguyen dismissed the claim without ordering any ac-
tion, Judge Fitzgerald had nothing to stay because “[t]he Court . . . did not enjoin
California from attempting to enforce the Act.”158 It appears that the lawyers for the
artists may consider the denial of the motion a possible hint that the Ninth Circuit
may find no merit in Judge Nguyen’s Commerce Clause analysis of the statute.159
III. RECENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION ATTEMPTS
A. Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011
As Judge Nguyen stated in her opinion, Congress may regulate the art market
pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.160 She concluded that the
art market has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce, therefore bringing it
under the power of Congress to regulate.161 Despite this power, attempts at federal leg-
islation regarding resale royalties have failed. In late 2011, however, Representative
Jerrold Nadler of New York introduced new legislation regarding droit de suite.162
The bill, known as the Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011 (EVAA), would provide
a seven-percent royalty for works sold for $10,000 or more at major auction houses,
half of which would go to the artist and half would go to non-profit art museums.163
The legislation provides for the following:
Whenever a work of visual art is sold as the result of auction of
that work by someone other than the artist who is the author of
156 Andrew Russeth, Court Ruling Reminds Art World that California Resale Royalty Law
Remains in Effect, GALLERIST (June 8, 2012, 2:25 PM), http://galleristny.com/2012/06/court
-ruling-reminds-art-world-that-california-resale-royalty-law-remains-in-effect.
157 Shane Ferro, Artists Score Backhanded Win in California Resale Royalties Case, But
Longer Fight Looms, BLOUIN ART INFO (June 8, 2012), http://www.blouinartinfo.com/news
/story/807627/artists-score-backhanded-win-in-california-resale-royalties-case-but-longer
-fight-looms.
158 Order Denying Ex Parte Application, Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. CV-11-
8604-MWF (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2012). Judge Fitzgerald also disclosed that Eric George, coun-
sel for the artists, is a member of Senator Barbara Boxer’s Judicial Advisory Committee for
the Central District of California, which recommended him for the open judicial position. Id.
159 Ferro, supra note 157.
160 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
161 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Power ex-
tends to a local activity if Congress has a rational basis for determining that the activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce).
162 See Stoilas, supra note 38.
163 Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, S. 2000, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
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the work, the entity that collects the money or other consider-
ation paid for the sale of the work shall, within 90 days of collect-
ing such money or other consideration, pay out of the proceeds
of the sale a royalty equal to 7 percent of the price. Such royalty
shall be paid to a visual artists’ collecting society. The collecting
society shall distribute, no fewer than 4 times per year, 50 percent
of the net royalty to the artist or his or her successor as copyright
owner. After payment to the artist or his or her successor as copy-
right owner, the remaining 50 percent of the net royalty shall be
deposited into an escrow account established by the collecting
society for the purposes of funding purchases by nonprofit art
museums in the United States of works of visual art authored by
living artists domiciled in the United States.164
Representative Nadler said of the bill, “It’s important to ensure that artists are fairly
compensated—even more so in difficult economic times, when normal channels of
support for artists are less dependable.”165 He continued by stating that the bill would
“provide incentives for the creation of art by providing resale royalty rights and
establishing a fund for nonprofit art museums to buy art from those artists.”166 How-
ever, Representative Nadler’s statement overlooks the fact that this legislation would
provide an incentive to buy works by already established artists, because it places
the royalty on pieces sold for over $10,000.167 Therefore the bill would serve those
artists, not emerging artists, rebutting the “starving artist” theory to which Nadler
alluded in his comments.168 While some have argued that the escrow account created
under the EVAA for museum purchases will be “beneficial for young and emerging
artists,”169 this assumption may not be enough to overcome the burden of the price
threshold on younger artists.
The concept of the poor artist is a fundamental principle that underlies the droit
de suite doctrine, but historically, these legislative proposals have not protected the
poor or emerging artist, undercutting the intended rationale behind droit de suite.170
164 Id.
165 Stoilas, supra note 38 (quoting Representative Jerrold Nadler).
166 Id.
167 S. 2000 § 3.
168 Id. But see Mike Boehm, Nationwide Royalty on Artwork Sales Introduced in Congress,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/16/entertainment/la-et-artist
-royalties-20111216 (arguing that the portion reserved for museums will encourage those
museums to invest in new artists).
169 Mione, supra note 17, at 489.
170 Prior to the California statute’s ratification, Monroe E. Price and Aimée Brown Price
argued that droit de suite rests on the fact that a “postponement in value is attributable to the
lag in popular understanding and appreciation . . . therefore the artist is subsidizing the
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Judith Prowda, Chair of the Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law Section of the New
York Bar Association, writes that the droit de suite legislation, such as the proposed
EVAA, is “ineffective” and that the benefits are “highly skewed.”171 She argues that
“the law enriches a very small minority of artists who actually see their works resold
and gain in value.”172 Even when Scull placed his Rauschenberg works in the 1973
auction, Rauschenberg was a well-known, established artist, evidenced by the mere
fact his works were in a highly publicized Sotheby’s sale. A resale royalty would not
have been beneficial to Rauschenberg when the works were sold in 1973. Instead,
he arguably would have benefitted more from some type of subsidy when he created
the works years before the Scull auction and, more importantly, years before he was
an established American artist.
Moreover, the legislation excludes sales conducted through private sale and only
imposes the royalty on public auctions. This disregards the large number of transac-
tions that occur privately.173 Legislation such as the EVAA may push auction houses
into the private market, which would not be subject to the royalty and, accordingly,
would not help in compensating artists.174 Further, the importance of auction houses
in the art market cannot be overstated. As one of the most transparent aspects of the
art market, which in itself is far from completely transparent,175 the major auction
houses serve as “the greatest value-adding component” to contemporary art.176 On
the other hand, the private secondary art market “is the least transparent and least
public’s education with his poverty.” Monroe E. Price & Aimée Brown Price, Rights of
Artists: The Case of the Droit de Suite, 31 ART J. 144, 144 (1971).
171 Judith B. Prowda, Assessing Artist’s Resale Rights Legislation, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202539351744.
172 Id.
173 See Benjamin Genocchio, Auction Houses Versus Private Sales: What Is the Future
of Buying Art?, BLOUIN ART INFO (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/830496
/auction-houses-versus-private-sales-what-is-the-future-of; see also Carol Vogel, In Slump,
More Art Is Selling in Private, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A17 (arguing that selling pri-
vately is a strategic move for collectors during difficult economic times). In an opinion piece,
Abigail Esman suggests that the bill may also thwart contemporary sales all together by
encouraging collectors to invest in Old Masters, Modern, and Impressionist artists. Abigail
R. Esman, Op-Ed., The Droit de Suite Dilemma (and Why It’s Just a Bad Idea), FORBES
(Dec. 12, 2011, 11:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailesman/2011/12/21/the-droit
-de-suite-dilemma.
174 See Nic Forrest, The Coming Out of Private Art Sales, ART MARKET BLOG (Apr.
30, 2012), http://www.artmarketblog.com/2012/04/30/the-coming-out-of-private-art-sales
-artmarketblog-com; see also CHRISTIE’S PRIVATE SALES, CHRISTIE’S, http://www.christies
privatesales.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
175 Auctions are still cloaked with some mystery. For instance, many buyers will opt to
place their bids through a representative or through a telephone bid, allowing them to main-
tain their anonymity. See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 131–32.
176 Id. at 13.
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regulated major commercial activity in the world.”177 If the market moved away
from the auction houses to the private hands of dealers in an effort to avoid addi-
tional fees under the EVAA, the entire market could suffer.
B. Copyright Inquiry of 2012
The U.S. Copyright Office made the decision to relaunch an inquiry into the
possibility of amending current copyright law.178 The move was likely in response
to the recent developments in droit de suite, both in this country and abroad, includ-
ing the introduction of the EVAA179 and the European Union directive180 to members
to implement droit de suite legislation. The inquiry described international develop-
ments, including the United Kingdom’s adoption of resale royalty legislation.181 It
also outlined developments in the United States with the district court decision in
Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc. and the introduction of the EVAA.182 The in-
quiry posed questions about the possible implications the royalty may have on the
existing American art market:
The effect of a resale royalty on current or future markets is a
related, important question, though that is not to say that the law
must or should protect all existing business models. Is it possi-
ble, however, that a resale royalty right might add to the costs of
those who buy and invest in artworks and, if so, are such costs
acceptable from a policy perspective? In this regard, the art mar-
ket should be broadly defined, including emerging artists, heirs,
investors and collectors.183
The U.S. Copyright Office was, thus, rightly beyond looking at the fairness argu-
ment and considering the larger impact that a resale royalty act would have on the
larger art market. These implications will be discussed below.
The inquiry asked for “comment from the public on factual and policy matters
addressed above, including the potential effect of a resale royalty on visual artists,
current copyright law and practical implications for commerce.”184 This suggests
that the trend is moving toward the passage of federal droit de suite legislation.
177 Id. at 29.
178 See Resale Royalty Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,175 (Sept. 19, 2012).
179 See supra Part II.A.
180 See supra notes 103–05.
181 Resale Royalty Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 58,177.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 58,177–78.
184 Id. at 58,179.
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On December 12, 2013, the U.S. Copyright Office released its 124-page report,
suggesting “that Congress may want to consider a resale royalty, as well as a num-
ber of possible alternative or complementary options for supporting visual artists,
within the broader context of industry norms, market practices, and other pertinent
data.”185 The Report acknowledged the disadvantage that visual artists face com-
pared to other types of creators because they “do not share in the long-term financial
success of their works because works of visual art are produced singularly and valued
for their scarcity.”186 Although the Report cited several factors for its support, it also
recognized that it is unclear what the implications would be of droit de suite on the
American art market.187 Because of that, the Report only recommended that any type
of resale royalty benefit only the artist during his life and it be applied proactively.188
The Report was requested by Senator Herb Kohl and Representative Jerrold Nadler,
the sponsors of the EVAA.189 In February 2014, a revised version of the EVAA, en-
titled American Royalties Too Act (A.R.T.), was introduced to Congress, which re-
duces the proposed droit de suite from seven percent to five percent on any piece sold
at auction for over $5,000.190 Nadler has stated that he only would apply the EVAA
to auction houses, not to any private sales conducted through dealers and galleries.191
However, as will be argued below, this would only force more sales into the ultra-
secretive private sphere and could severely impact the number of artists who benefit
from any type of droit de suite legislation because the number of sales conducted
publicly is limited.
IV. ARGUMENT AGAINST FEDERAL LEGISLATION
One of the arguments against the recent move to pass federal legislation codify-
ing artist resale royalty rights is the fact that the United States is a common-law
country.192 Accordingly, the analogy to France and other civil-law countries is mis-
placed.193 A more accurate comparison can be made between the United States’
efforts and the recent move to droit de suite laws passed in the United Kingdom.
185 2013 REPORT, supra note 107.
186 Id.
187 Julia Halperin, Copyright Office Reverses Its Position on Droit de Suite in the US, ART
NEWSPAPER (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/US-Copyright-Office
-reverses-its-position-on-droit-de-suite-in-the-US/31365.
188 2013 REPORT, supra note 107, at 77.
189 Halperin, supra note 187.
190 Patricia Cohen, New Bill Proposes Auction Royalties for Artists, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26,
2014, 2:20 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/new-bill-proposes-auction
-royalties-for-artists/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
191 Halperin, supra note 187.
192 See Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ & Artists’ Moral Rights: A Compar-
ative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 142–43 (1997).
193 See Prowda, supra note 171 (“Copyright law in civil law countries, such as France, is
grounded in the droit moral, or the moral rights, which views creative works as an extension
of the author’s personality.”).
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The European Union, of which the United Kingdom is a member, passed a direc-
tive in 2001, requiring its member states to pass droit de suite legislation.194 Many
countries, including France and Germany, already had such protection in place.
However, the United Kingdom resisted, fearing that the enactment of such legislation
would have a negative effect on its art market.195 The United Kingdom was required
to have some legislation in place by January 1, 2006, for resale royalties to living
artists.196 They were required by January 1, 2010, to provide for artists’ estates.197 Sev-
eral commentators predicted that the implementation of droit de suite legislation
would have a crippling effect on the British art market, sending collectors, dealers,
and sellers to New York.198 Anthony Browne of the British Art Market Federation
predicted that “[the royalty] is expensive and complicated to administer, and it will
shift buyers and sellers from the U.K., which has lost a considerable amount of
global art market share in the past five years, to countries where there is no royalty
to be paid.”199
Despite these concerns, it appears that the legislation has not resulted in the
demise of the British art market. One auction specialist at Bonham’s in London said:
When [droit de suite] was first introduced in 2008 there was a
lot of opposition and a prevailing belief that it would affect the
British market locally and internationally. We are yet to experi-
ence such an impact in auction related sales and London has in
fact strengthened as an art market capital in recent years.200
Auction houses have continued to see strong sales, with modern and contemporary
sales fetching over $140 million each.201 It will be necessary to monitor the trends
194 See E.U. Directive, supra note 103.
195 See Jennifer B. Pfeffer, Comment, The Costs and Legal Impracticalities Facing Imple-
mentation of the European Union’s Droit de Suite Directive in the United Kingdom, 24 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 533, 534 (2004). This was the not the first time a European Union direc-
tive had a negative impact on the United Kingdom’s art market; when a 2.5% value-added tax
was imposed in 1995, it pushed sellers to the New York market. See Carol Vogel, Poignant
Cry at London Auctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1997, at C9 (quoting a consultant at Christie’s
who said, “In the end it is not up to us. Unless Europe decides it is desirable to have an art mar-
ket in Europe, we’re lost.”); see also Is London Done For?, ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 54.
196 E.U. Directive, supra note 103, at art. 6, art. 12.
197 Id. art. 8, § 2.
198 See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 195, at C9 (“In the frenetic art world, [London’s] loss has
been New York City’s gain.”).
199 Grant, supra note 27; see also The British Art Market: A Winning Global Entrepôt,
BRITISH ART MARKET FEDERATION (2010), available at http://www.lapada.org/public/The
_British_art_Market.pdf.
200 E-mail from Rupert Worrall, Head of Dep’t, Old Master, Modern & Contemporary
Prints, Bonham’s, to author (Oct. 1, 2013, 11:21 AM EST) (on file with author).
201 See Daniel Grant, UK’s Artist Resale Royalty Law Didn’t Damage the Art Market
(Despite All the Claims), HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 14, 2012, 10:42 AM), http://www
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of the market over the next several years. Because the United Kingdom is so closely
linked with the rest of Europe, the impact on European sales should remain at a
minimum. However, there is a very real possibility that the market will shift toward
the United States, as sellers bring their works to American centers, in particular,
New York. If sellers begin to move their sales to the United States, this would serve
as even more incentive to resist any American droit de suite legislation attempts.
However, despite the fact that the E.U. Directive has not had the negative im-
pact many thought would occur to this point, the principle behind droit de suite in
the United Kingdom and the United States remains at odds because common-law
copyright law is based on economic, not moral rights. Michael Rushton argues that
“a government mandated scheme that is inalienable and unwaivable is difficult to
justify.”202 Further, Jennifer Pfeffer argues that “[t]he purpose of the droit de suite
is to give visual artists rights and economic incentives similar to those the law gives
to authors and musicians.”203 While the fairness argument can be made, fairness is
a principle of the droit moral found in civil-law countries, not in common-law
countries, such as the United States.204
Despite the fact that the droit de suite measures seem to have had little negative
impact in Great Britain to date, there are still serious concerns that the U.S. Con-
gress must address before passing any similar legislation. These include the potential
prohibitive administrative costs in enforcing such legislation, the lack of transpar-
ency in the art world, and finally that the law would help too few, specifically those
artists who were already established in the field.205
The art world notoriously has been cloaked in secrecy. Moreover, collectors
and sellers are turning to private sales, as opposed to public auctions, to buy and sell
works.206 Michael Findlay, a gallery director in New York, has said, “If [a piece]
doesn’t sell [privately], it’s not a public event . . . However, if your painting is on
the cover of an auction catalog and it’s been marketed globally and then doesn’t
sell—ouch!”207 Therefore, any droit de suite legislation would have to extend be-
yond auction sales to private sales; however, this lack of transparency will make
.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-grant/uks-artist-resaleroyalty_b_1881430.html; see, e.g., Art
Market News: Modern British Art Performs Best at Sotheby’s Auction, TELEGRAPH (May 15,
2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/artsales/9267228/Art-market-news
-Modern-British-art-performs-best-at-Sothebys-auction.html.
202 Michael Rushton, The Law and Economics of Artists’ Inalienable Rights, 25 J.
CULTURAL ECON. 243, 250 (2001).
203 Pfeffer, supra note 195, at 547–48; see also supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
204 See generally DaSilva, supra note 48.
205 For more on the “information problem,” see Stephanie B. Turner, The Artist’s Resale
Royalty Right: Overcoming the Information Problem, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 329 (2012).
206 Katya Kazakina, Bargain Warhols, Secrecy Bring Collectors to Private Art Sales,
BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=apWHlzppIlaM.
207 Id.
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accounting and administration very difficult.208 If buyers and sellers consciously
move to private deals to avoid publicity, then a scheme like the EVAA, which ap-
plies to works sold over $10,000 at public auction,209 may force even more secrecy
in the art world, with more deals brokered privately.
If more sales are conducted privately, with generally fewer auction sales, the
amount of secrecy in an already unregulated art market may increase and could af-
fect tastes in the market.210 This could negatively impact more emerging artists who
want to use auctions as a way of promoting themselves. Additionally, auctions are
an important tool for establishing taste and therefore value, regardless of whether
the sale takes place publicly or privately.211
Proponents of droit de suite legislation continue to argue that fairness is an un-
derlying principle.212 Artists argue that collectors receive a windfall with secondary
sales when they sell pieces for significantly more than the initial purchase.213 In
defending the rationale of droit de suite, proponents often cite the Rauschenberg-
Scull story, suggesting Rauschenberg was a poor artist who was not able to enjoy the
profits of his creation on that evening in 1973.214 However, few continue the story
to include Scull’s response to Rauschenberg—“It works for you, too, Bob.”215 This
comment is crucially important when analyzing the art market and resale royalty’s
place within it. The assumption that collectors and dealers receive a windfall with
sales on the secondary market is misplaced.216 It incorrectly assumes that increases
in value occur in a vacuum. Art does not automatically appreciate over time, in the
same way other investments, such as real property, may. For instance, dealers have a
range of marketing responsibilities for their artists that includes advertising, securing
208 See Turner, supra note 205, at 350–53 (describing the secrecy surrounding private sales).
209 H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); S. 2000, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
210 See, e.g., Robin Pogrebin & Kevin Flynn, As Art Values Rise, So Do Concerns About
Market’s Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, at A1 (discussing the debate surrounding
relating the market).
211 See Eric Konigsberg, The Trials of Art Superdealer Larry Gagosian, VULTURE (Jan. 20,
2013, 9:10 PM), http://www.vulture.com/2013/01/art-superdealer-larry-gagosian.html.
212 See Reddy, supra note 51, at 517.
213 See Wirsching, supra note 48, at 432.
214 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 205, at 338.
215 HADEN-GUEST, supra note 1, at 16.
216 In fact, one could argue that the artists are receiving a windfall. Using an economic
analysis, Asher Tanenbaum argues:
When a creator sells his [artwork] he discharges the risk and reward
that comes with owning the [art] in return for the present value of the
[art]. Yet [droit de suite] allows the creator to keep a hand in the cookie
jar. [Droit de suite] disrupts the allocation of risk and reward by giving
the creator a contingent interest in the [art]. The creator has no invest-
ment in the [art] but can benefit nonetheless.
Tanenbaum, supra note 49, at 22.
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exhibitions, and general public relations management.217 As Thompson describes it,
“most marketing is not intended to produce immediate sales, but rather to build the
dealer brand and obtain coverage for the artist in art publications.”218 In other words,
the dealer’s goal is to increase the artist’s reputation, which ultimately results in the ap-
preciation of the artist’s work. The dealer is working for his artist as much as the artist
is working for his dealer. While dealers and collectors are certainly distinguishable—
for instance, a dealer receives a percentage of any sales—their roles in an artist’s ca-
reer can both be invaluable. An established dealer who represents an emerging artist
or a collector who invests in him both can launch that artist’s career.
Therefore, the effort of collectors, museums, and dealers must be factored into
the appreciation of works.219 Economist Don Thompson writes that contemporary
art is described “in terms of innovation, investment value, and the artist being ‘hot,’
meaning a relative unknown where word-of-mouth reports make them suddenly
sought-after.”220 It is this group of stakeholders who determine who and what is
“hot” in the art world, often racing to find the newest trend in which to invest both
their time and money. Accordingly, these investments in emerging artists serve an
important role in influencing the market. Henry Hopkins,221 former director of the
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, gave the following statement shortly after
the CRRA was passed, explaining the importance of collectors and highly estab-
lished artists:
[Sam Francis222 is] selling now in the $30,000 to $40,000 range
for a major canvas. Let’s say a collector who bought one of his
works 15 years ago for $3,000 decides, for the benefit of his
family, to sell now for $40,000. I’d think it would put Sam in a
terrible moral position. Does he press the 5 percent claim or not?
217 THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 31.
218 Id.
219 As Don Thompson argues, even the type of dealer is a factor that must be considered
when determining value. He argues that a branded dealer will be able to fetch higher prices
for works because “it is the dealer branding, and substitution of the dealer’s choice and
judgment for the collector’s, that add value.” Id. at 14. He argues that dealers—like Larry
Gagosian—who give their stamp of approval to any artist will instantly increase that artist’s
legitimacy and, thus, value. Id.
220 Id. at 12.
221 Henry T. Hopkins was the director of the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art from
1974 until 1986. Under his leadership, the museum transitioned from the San Francisco
Museum of Art to the Museum of Modern Art. See Kenneth Baker, Henry T. Hopkins Dies,
Put ‘Modern’ in SFMOMA, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 1, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com
/bayarea/article/Henry-T-Hopkins-dies-put-Modern-in-SFMOMA-3215228.php.
222 See generally CONNIE W. LEMBARK, THE PRINTS OF SAM FRANCIS: A CATALOGUE
RAISONNÉ 1960–1990 (1992).
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After all, the person who bought his work for $3,000 back in the
old days did more for Sam than $2,000 now will ever do.223
Museums also add to this value, because when they exhibit an artist’s work, they
add to the work’s provenance, or the work’s exhibition and major public sale his-
tory.224 The better the provenance, the higher the piece will fetch, increasing the
artist’s reputation.225 Additionally, museum acquisitions and exhibitions can give
“immediate validation and reputation enhancement” to younger artists, “which often
translate[s] into financial success that in the long run likely exceeds any resale roy-
alty an artist would receive.”226 Furthermore, publication, commissions, and exhi-
bitions all contribute to the “fostering” of an artist’s career and “ensuring that [an
artist] can make a living from their creative efforts.”227 The American Association
of Museum Directors (AAMD) has stated its opposition to any proposed droit de
suite legislation, expressing its concerns that a resale royalty could stymie the mar-
ket for new artists. Instead, it argues, the existing system of supporting both estab-
lished and emerging artists does much more for the individual artist without the fear
of depressing the market.228
Special exhibitions like the Whitney Museum of American Art’s Biennial229 and
“superdealers” like Charles Saatchi230 and Larry Gagosian231 also create taste. Eric
Shiner, the director of the Andy Warhol Museum, commented that “[i]n many ways,
223 Bates, supra note 113, at 67 (emphasis added).
224 See Missy Sullivan, Provenance: Ignore It at Your Peril, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2005),
http://www.forbes.com/2005/02/11/cz_ms_0211soapbox2_inl.html (suggesting a good prov-
enance can increase the value of a work); see also Kimerly Rorschach, Comment from the
Association of Art Museum Directors (Dec. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Comment from the AAMD],
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/comments/77fr58175/Association
_of_Art_Museum_Directors.pdf (listing the ways, independent of droit de suite, in which
museums help to advance artists’ careers).
225 THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 13. Thompson lumps all of these important players in the
market as recognizable “brands,” which he argues helps to increase the value of contempo-
rary artists. Id. He writes that “[t]he motivation that drives the consumer to bid at a branded
auction house, or to purchase from a branded dealer, or to prefer art that [is shown] at a
branded museum, is the same motivation that drives the purchase of other luxury consumer
goods.” Id.
226 Comment from the AAMD, supra note 224, at 2.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 3.
229 See, e.g., Roberta Smith, A Survey of a Different Color, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, at C21
(describing the 2012 Whitney Biennial); Jerry Saltz, Leaving Babylon, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 1,
2012), http://nymag.com/arts/art/reviews/whitney-biennial-saltz-2012-3.
230 See generally RITA HATTON & JOHN ALBERT WALKER, SUPERCOLLECTOR: A CRITIQUE
OF CHARLES SAATCHI (2000).
231 See Konigsberg, supra note 211 (arguing that Larry Gagosian and other superdealers
shape the art market).
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having a show with [Gagosian] is synonymous with having a show at MoMA or the
Tate Modern [in London].”232 Gagosian is largely responsible for the market for
Warhol’s screen prints, while Charles Saatchi was the inventor of the “Young
British Artists,” and should be attributed for elevating the status of then relatively
unknown artists like Tracey Emin and Damien Hirst.233 Even successive auction
sales can influence taste. As Don Thompson acknowledges, “An uncertain bidder
is doubly persuaded; two auction houses and two different sets of specialists say that
contemporary art is desirable, prestigious, and a good investment. The unsuccessful
bidder at the first auction may be an even more determined bidder at the second.”234
These players in the art market are searching constantly for young, raw talent.
They want to be responsible for seeing their investment grow. However, federal droit
de suite legislation could dissuade collectors and dealers from taking that risk with
younger artists, for fear that the return on their investment may be diminished due to
potential royalty fees. Under an incentive-based common-law system, if collectors,
museums, and dealers are dissuaded from making these investments, the underlying
purpose of the resale royalty to support artists ultimately will be defeated.
Furthermore, one only need to look as far as California to see that droit de suite
will not be successful in the United States. If one considers California’s move al-
most forty years ago as an example of a “laboratory of experimentation”235 under a
federalism theory, then obviously the experiment has not succeeded. Artists are not
benefitting from the statute because they are not receiving the royalties they are due,
as evident by the class-action lawsuit against Christie’s and Sotheby’s in Estate of
Graham. Expanding this type of program to a federal level will only increase the
frustrations that artists face when trying to collect royalties. The combination of fed-
eral bureaucracy and the lack of transparency in the art world may be too difficult
to overcome. Therefore, the market could suffer because of the mere fact that federal
legislation was passed. However, the artists may not benefit practically from droit
de suite legislation because of the difficulties in collecting and distributing the
232 Id. (quoting Eric Shiner).
233 Id. The term “Young British Artists” was coined after a Saatchi exhibition, Sensation:
Young British Artists from the Saatchi Gallery, in 1997. See generally NORMAN ROSENTHAL
& RICHARD STONE, SENSATION: YOUNG BRITISH ARTISTS FROM THE SAATCHI COLLECTION
(1997). The exhibition caused a scandal when it traveled to the Brooklyn Museum of Art,
after Mayor Rudolph Guiliani threatened to withdraw funding to the museum because one
of the artists, Chris Ofili, incorporated elephant dung in his portrait of the Virgin Mary. See
Gustav Niebuhr, Anger over Work Evokes Anti-Catholic Shadow, and Mary’s Power as Icon,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at 48.
234 THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 21.
235 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country.”); see James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories”
Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475 (1996).
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royalties. Ultimately, then, no one benefits from this type of legislation. The art mar-
ket in the United States is not conducive to such legislation for the purposes outlined
above, and the failure of the California statute to protect artists demonstrates that.
There are alternatives to droit de suite that can be considered to address the fair-
ness concerns echoed by proponents of resale royalty legislation. Private contracts be-
tween artists and buyers can address the resale concern. Don Thompson suggests that
dealers who want exclusive access to developing artists may offer stipends to keep them
producing art.236 Thompson writes that Charles Saatchi once offered English artist
Jenny Saville a monthly stipend for two years for first right of refusal for any works
she created.237 “This is precisely what patrons in Renaissance Italy did—supporting
an artist over a period of time in anticipation of later acquiring their work.”238 While
this could result in the artist feeling more like a cog in the dealer’s money-making
machine, the underlying issue of fair compensation would be addressed.239
Additionally, museums could compensate artists for exhibiting their works; how-
ever, this initiative may be unrealistic as museum funding has suffered since the
recent financial crisis.240 If the idea that merely exhibiting an artist can boost value,
however, then compensating artists could be considered unnecessary. If the goal of
compensating artists is to support and encourage younger artists to exhibit in im-
portant spaces, then it appears that this model would be more effective than droit de
suite, which would primarily target more established artists in the secondary market.
Government subsidies schemes are another option. In the United States, government
funding is funneled through the National Endowment for the Arts, which is still one-
twentieth of the support provided to French artists by the French Culture Ministry.241
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit will determine in the coming months whether the California
Resale Royalty Act is constitutional. If the court finds that it does violate the Com-
merce Clause and invalidates the statute, then proponents of droit de suite must turn
to the federal government to pass legislation. Regardless of the court’s holding, the
initiative to pass federal legislation will continue. However, the Equity for Visual
236 THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 46.
237 Id. at 90. Saville, one of the Young British Artists, is now represented by Larry Gagosian.
See GAGOSIAN GALLERY, http://www.gagosian.com/artists/jenny-saville (last visited Mar. 2,
2014).
238 THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 90.
239 See id. at 46.
240 See, e.g., The Status of New York State’s Museums 2012, MUSEUM ASS’N OF N.Y.
(2011), http://manyonline.org/advocacy/status-nys-museums (“A national survey conducted
by the American Association of Museums of 383 museums reports that 70 percent of re-
spondents are in economic stress, with 32 percent suffering ‘severe’ or ‘very severe’ stress.”).
241 THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 181.
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Artists Act of 2011 will not address the “starving artist” dilemma, as it will provide
royalties for already-established artists. Collectors, museums, and dealers may turn
their focus away from contemporary art to avoid these resale royalties. Without these
taste-makers investing in younger, emerging artists, the larger art market will be
damaged, reducing the benefits from any type of resale royalty.
Therefore, collectors should be encouraged to purchase works of art and not
threatened with a potential penalty for identifying talent. Moreover, the basic idea
of fairness is not a strong enough principle in the U.S. common-law system to over-
ride the established copyright doctrine, which incentivizes production. By working
with collectors, dealers, and museums, younger artists can work together to increase
the value of their pieces. Ultimately, no one receives a windfall and all of these
groups benefit. As Robert Scull said to Robert Rauschenberg during their now-
infamous confrontation when Rauschenberg claimed he had done all of the work for
Scull to enjoy the profit, “It works for you, too, Bob. Now I hope you’ll get even bet-
ter prices.”242 Indeed, Rauschenberg may not have seen a return for his pieces that
sold that autumn evening in 1973; however, one cannot overstate the vital impor-
tance that the sale had on his career.243 Although Rauschenberg claimed he worked
his “ass off just for [Scull] to make [a] profit,”244 Rauschenberg’s Thaw did not in-
crease in value magically in the fifteen years between when he created the work and
when Scull ultimately sold it.245 Scull’s influence in the art world contributed to the
success of all of the pieces in the sale.
The U.S. government should not pass federal artist resale royalty legislation be-
cause droit de suite does not produce a windfall for collectors and dealers who resell
pieces and may actually provide a disincentive for those stakeholders to purchase art.
242 HADEN-GUEST, supra note 1, at 16.
243 See THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 56 (noting that Rauschenberg is the sixth-top contem-
porary artist behind Jasper Johns, Andy Warhol, Gerhard Richter, Bruce Nauman, and Roy
Lichtenstein).
244 HADEN-GUEST, supra note 1, at 16.
245 See id.
